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Abstract: 
This paper presents Sen’s theory of agency, focusing on the role of commitment in this 
theory as both problematic and potentially illuminating. His account of some 
commitments as goal-displacing gives rise to a dilemma given the standard philosophical 
theory of agency. Either commitment-motivated actions are externally motivated, in 
which case they are not expressions of agency, or such actions are internally motivated, 
in which case the commitment is not goal-displacing.  I resolve this dilemma and 
accommodate his view of commitment as motivation by developing a broader descriptive 
theory of agency, which recognizes both agent goal-directed and goal-displacing 
commitments. I propose a type of goal-displacing commitment, which I call “tacit 
commitment,” that can be seen to fit between the horns. Tacit commitments regulate 
behavior without being made conscious and explicit. This resolution suggests a means of 
bridging the normative/descriptive gap in social-scientific explanation. 
 
1. Introduction 
 Amartya Sen is the most important and prolific living philosopher-economist, 
having made seminal contributions to economic science in the fields of social choice 
                                                
1An earlier version of this paper was presented at a Symposium on the Work of Amartya 
Sen, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands, July 1, 2010, and I am especially 
grateful to Ingrid Robeyns, who organized the symposium, and Amartya Sen, who 
commented on the papers, as well as my co-symposiasts Mozaffar Qizilbash, Henry 
Richardson, and Ingrid Robeyns, and the audience for the session. I also thank Elizabeth 
Anderson and Neal Becker for feedback on the earlier version. The paper benefitted from 
discussion with audiences at the University of Washington and the University of Kansas 
Departments of Philosophy.  Finally, I received excellent suggestions from two 
anonymous referees and from the Editor of Economics and Philosophy, for which I am 
very grateful. 
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theory, welfare economics, feminist economics, and the explanation of famines,2 but also 
original contributions to consequentialist ethics, political philosophy, feminist 
philosophy, identity theory, and the theory of justice. He draws many deep connections 
between the descriptive and normative approaches in both economics and philosophy. In 
Sen’s view, economic science must comprise normative as well as descriptive elements 
in order to successfully explain human behavior. Human agents respond to many kinds of 
incentives and constraints that are normatively derived or inflected. However, normative 
and descriptive approaches sometimes conflict and give rise to contradictory ideas, as can 
be seen in Sen’s work on agency and commitment. 
Although he has written extensively on agency in the context of moral and 
political theory,3 he has been less explicit about his descriptive theory of agency for use 
in explanatory theory. This can in part be explained by the fact that neo-classical 
economists tend either to downplay or eliminate the role of agency, or to give it a 
simplistic motivational structure in their explanations of behavior. Sen rejects both the 
behaviorist and reductionist impulses, however. His writings offer an illuminating 
descriptive theory of agency, which attributes two very different types of motivations to 
behavior: self-interest and other-directed commitment. Sen, as I shall argue, ultimately 
grounds agency not in intentional goal-directed behavior, but in a broader view of norm-
governed behavior.  
In this paper I will present Sen’s theory of agency, focusing on the role of 
commitment in this theory as both problematic and potentially illuminating. Sen’s 
discussion of commitment begins as part of his rejection of the behavioristic foundations 
of rational choice theory begun in his early work. This critique was initially seen as being 
aimed only at revealed preference theory, which made some commentators think that the 
critique could be rather easily incorporated into economic theory in a way that affected it 
minimally. However, the critique goes deeper than that. In fact, Sen recognized a whole 
category of human motivation – which he calls “commitment” – that neither revealed 
                                                
2 Sen is the 1998 winner of the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences. 
3 See for examples (Sen 1982, 1985b, 1999). 
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preference theory nor a less behavioristic interpretation of standard preference theory can 
easily accommodate, if at all.  
Commitments, according to Sen, may replace or even displace the agent’s own 
goals. Sen’s account of commitment as goal-displacing gives rise to a dilemma, however, 
given the standard philosophical theory of agency. Either commitment-motivated actions 
are externally motivated, in which case they are not expressions of agency, or such 
actions are internally motivated, in which case the commitment is not goal-displacing.  I 
resolve this dilemma and accommodate his view of commitment as motivation by 
developing a broader descriptive theory of agency, which recognizes both agent goal-
directed and goal-displacing commitments. This resolution suggests a means of bridging 
the normative/descriptive gap in social-scientific explanation. 
 
2. Sen’s normative account of agency and its implications for the descriptive account 
 For Sen, an agent is ‘‘someone who acts and brings about change, and whose 
achievements can be judged in terms of her own values and objectives, whether or not we 
assess them in terms of some external criteria as well.’’ (Sen 1999:18). Agency involves 
two discrete elements: formulating an end and acting on or pursuing that end. One of the 
unique contributions of Sen’s normative account of agency is to recognize that persons 
have two aspects that need to be considered in moral and political theory: an agency 
aspect, which is "the moral power to have a conception of the good" (Sen 1985: 186) and 
a well-being aspect, which consists, roughly speaking, of the things that make a life 
objectively go well for a person.4  Any moral theory that is concerned about the 
consequences of actions or policies on people’s lives must consider persons’ well-being, 
but such theories must also be concerned about the persons’ own intentions and desires, 
independently of how the actions that they give rise to affect persons’ well-being. To be 
an agent is to form a conception of the good, which may involve raising one’s level of 
well-being, but may also at times involve sacrificing one’s well-being for something else 
that one values. “Some types of agency roles, e.g., those related to fulfilling obligations, 
                                                
4 On Sen’s view well-being is to be understood in terms of capabilities for functioning 
see (Sen 1999). 
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can quite possibly have a negative impact on the person’s well-being. Even when the 
impact is positive, the importance of the agency aspect has to be distinguished from the 
importance of the impact of agency on well-being.” (Sen 1985: 187)  
 This normative account of agency determines some elements of a corresponding 
descriptive account, but leaves others indeterminate. Descriptively, it implies that agents 
formulate their values and objectives and act in light of those values and objectives, 
which may not be connected with the person’s own well-being in any sense.  
Nonetheless, the motivations for action – the values and objectives – belong to the agent.  
Thus, agents define their own ends. The distinction between the agency aspect of persons 
and the well-being aspect of persons is one that does not fit well in the standard 
descriptive model of agency. Well-being, on this model, is part of the utility function of 
the agent insofar as she ranks it in her preference ordering. That model subsumes well-
being entirely within the agency aspect, and leaves any aspect of agents’ objective well-
being that does not play a role in the agent’s own preference ordering with no 
explanatory role. Thus one task of the descriptive theory of agency is to discover and 
explain agents’ objectives. Furthermore, the normative theory of agency does not 
determine how values and objectives give rise to actions. The economic theory of 
behavior explains behavior as the rational pursuit of agents’ values and objectives.  
 
3. Complicating the descriptive model of agency: context dependence and commitment 
 The standard neoclassical model of economic agency holds that agents are 
consistent preference bearers who make choices among their available options to 
maximize the satisfaction of their preferences. Preferences are represented by utility 
functions, and choice is represented by mathematical maximization of those functions 
subject to constraints. Some insights into Sen’s descriptive theory of agency can be 
gleaned from his critique of revealed preference theory. Sen’s critique of preference 
theory can be characterized generally as having two broad targets. The first, his critique 
of revealed preference theory, aims to refute the behaviorist attempt to derive preference 
from choice behavior. The second, his theory of commitment as an alternative source of 
motivation, aims to undermine the notion that rational behavior must be self-interested 
and to provide an alternative formalization of rational motivation. The two aims are 
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related, and he treats both of them in his influential (1977) “Rational Fools” paper, 
although some other papers address separately one or the other.  
3.1. Rejecting revealed preference theory 
In order to even get to the point of discussing agency, intention, and motivation as 
part of economic theory, Sen first had to critique the behaviorism of revealed preference 
theory, which purports to avoid all that by deriving preference from observations of 
individuals’ externally verifiable choice behavior. Influenced by the behaviorist 
commitment to limiting models to observables, economists beginning with Samuelson in 
the mid-20th century developed revealed preference theory (RPT), which derives 
preference from choice behavior, which is, at least in principle, observed. Revealed 
preference theory is based on the simple and operational idea that if an agent chooses x 
when y is available (within his budget constraint) then he prefers x to y. Arrow 
formalized this as the Weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP): if an agent prefers x 
to y, then she must not choose y over x when both are available to her. WARP thus places 
an internal consistency requirement on choice; rational agents are assumed to adhere to 
this requirement, and hence preference can be inferred from observed choices. In his 
(1973) “Behavior and the Concept of Preference” paper, Sen points out that this theory 
allowed Arrow to derive consumer behavior theory “with economy” and opened up 
empirical studies of preference by observing market behavior.   
Despite its “economy,” Sen criticized this theory on several grounds. First, and 
most fundamentally, it mystifies the causal order of preference and choice. Arrow aimed 
to free theory from mentalistic conceptions of preference and utility, because of 
longstanding concerns about the unobservability of mental states. But Sen argues that the 
theory is useful only under the assumption that there are preferences in the head of the 
agent that adhere to the reasonable assumption of WARP. Realistically speaking, from 
the point of view of the agent the preference comes first, although from the point of view 
of the scientist, preference is inferred from choice. Sen thus distanced himself from the 
behaviorist impulse to give a reductive account of agency, allowing for a more 
complicated and realistic theory of choice behavior and motivation. 
Second, Sen argued that choices can appear to violate the internal inconsistency 
requirements because of their context dependence, which can include menu dependence, 
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strategic opportunities, the situational and cultural dependence of social norms, and 
identities of the agents involved. In different articles over the course of several decades, 
Sen presents examples of how the choice act injects additional elements that make the 
internal consistency of choice impossible to observe directly from the choice itself. One 
is what he calls the chooser dependence of the choice, and this is illustrated by the mango 
example: a group of people each pick from a basket of apples and mangoes; having the 
last pick of fruit from a basket that includes one mango is a different choice situation than 
having the second to last pick when there is only one mango left. Even if one prefers the 
mango all other things equal, one might not wish to be seen as greedy or selfish by 
choosing the last mango and depriving another of that opportunity. Observing simply the 
choice behavior of an agent in the two situations leads one to the conclusion that the 
agent both prefers mangoes to apples and apples to mangoes. By recognizing how social 
norms contextualize the choice, the apparent inconsistency of the preferences can be 
explained away. And this means that social norms provide agents with another source of 
motivation that the theory needs to be able to capture. 
Sen argues that because the choice act itself is meaningful to agents, revealed 
preference theory cannot serve the behaviorist goal of avoiding getting into the heads of 
agents, or the positivistic role of avoiding positing realistic assumptions about how agents 
think about choices. In this way, social science models, while descriptive, are essentially 
different from those in the natural sciences because the former must take facts about 
norms into account. Sen points out a difference between maximization problems in 
physics and in descriptive sciences of human behavior. In the latter there is the fact of 
volition “maximizing behavior differs from non-volitional maximization because of the 
fundamental relevance of the choice act.” The choice act is important because it situates 
the chooser in a social context of norms that make the choices meaningful to agents and 
constrain the ways in which they choose beyond the physical constraints of the material 
situation at hand. 
Partly due to Sen’s work, the standard economic model of agency has been made 
more complex and enhanced by the recognition of informational asymmetries and the 
possibility of making strategic choices in contexts of interaction among other rational 
agents. Sen’s argument against revealed preference theory involves showing different 
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types of interests that a person might be satisfying with a given choice, including 
immediate self-interest, strategic interests, or an interest in adhering to moral duties or 
social norms. Hence, a single-valued utility function that is equated with any one of these 
interests will not be explanatorily sufficient, and a fortiori there is no simple 
maximization of such a function that will be sufficient.  
3.2. Self-interest vs. commitment 
Sen’s critique of the behavioral foundations of economic theory sets off from the 
critique of preference as inferred from choices and internal consistency conditions, but it 
does not stop there. The next step is to critique the assumption that all rational action is 
self-interested. One of the most important contributions to clarifying the economic theory 
of agency has been to analyze the assumption of self-interested behavior into three 
separable aspects, as follows:5 
1. self-centered welfare – the assumption that a rational person’s welfare depends 
only on her consumption.  
This is the assumption that agents value only their own consumption. On a restrictive 
notion of well-being as dependent only on the agent’s consumption of goods, self-
centered welfare is the assumption that the agent’s self-interest is equivalent to her well-
being. This assumption states how agents formulate their values, not their goals for acting 
or how they act in light of those goals. 
2. self-welfare goal – the assumption that a rational person’s goal is to maximize the 
expected value of her own welfare. 
This assumption states that an agent’s goal in acting is to maximize only her own 
objectives. It is not about what constitutes welfare or what the agent values, which could 
be narrow well-being, as with assumption 1; but welfare could also include another’s 
well-being. Nor is it about how agents choose in light of their goals, which is covered by 
the third aspect of self-interest. 
3. self-goal choice – the assumption that the rational person maximizes the 
satisfaction of her goals irrespective of others’ goals. 
                                                
5 (Sen1987) is I believe the first time he introduced this three-way distinction. 
 8 
This assumption is about how agents’ choose, namely, to achieve their own goals. The 
goal might include raising another’s welfare, or indeed, any other sort of goal, including 
collective goals, moral goals, or group norms as long as the agent takes that on as her 
goal.  
Although all three aspects are assumed in some economic models, self-centered 
welfare is fairly easily and readily given up. It is not only extremely unrealistic to assume 
that people do not get any welfare from anyone else’s consumption bundles, it is also 
unnecessary for the formalization of most of economic theory.6 There may be some good 
reasons to incorporate this assumption into one’s ethical theory,7 but descriptively it 
seems clearly false and misleadingly so.8 It would not allow us to make sense of any sort 
of other-directed behavior, whether positive or negative. The assumption of self-welfare 
goal is more commonly made and defended, but Sen questions this assumption for 
explaining some actions. 
In his “Rational Fools” paper Sen introduces the distinction between sympathy 
and commitment, two types of other-directed motivations. Sympathy involves one’s own 
feelings about the experiences of others; it is “the case in which concern for others 
directly affects one’s own welfare.” (Sen 1977: 95) Thus, admitting sympathy as a type 
of motivation, while it clearly does violate self-centered welfare, does not violate the self-
welfare goal assumption. Commitment as a motivation, however, drives a wedge between 
                                                
6 If self-centered welfare is given up along with self-welfare goal the resulting theory of 
motivation cannot be so easily incorporated into formal economic theory. 
7 The assumption of self-centered welfare implies that agents do not take an interest in 
the interests of others, an assumption called “non-tuism.” This assumption is useful in 
answering the moral skeptic because it sets the bar very high for showing why someone 
still ought to be moral. See for example (Dimock 1999). 
8 Keith Dowding (2002) seems to disagree with the “misleading” part of this claim, 
though, because he thinks that when used in aggregate models, the self-centered welfare 
goal is approximately correct and will lead to correct estimates of aggregate demand 
functions. For the moment I confine the discussion to the understanding and assessment 
of individual preferences. 
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personal welfare and choice. When one acts on a commitment, one does something for 
the sake of a principle, a promise, a group norm, or the anticipation of future welfare, but 
not – at least not directly – for one’s own welfare as one presently conceives it. Sen offers 
examples of choices where commitment seems to be at work including: contributing to 
public goods; truthfulness (i.e., that people normally tell the truth rather than simply say 
whatever is in their self-interest to say); voting; fiduciary responsibility; environmentally-
sensitive conduct, and work motivation.  
Although “commitment” has a positive connotation in ordinary speech, Sen does 
not assume that all behavior that takes commitment as its goal is positive let alone in the 
interest of all. “Groups intermediate between oneself and all – such as class, community, 
or occupation groups – provide the focus of many actions involving committed 
behavior.” (Sen 1987: 20) Group loyalty may involve sacrifice of one’s “purely personal” 
interests for the sake of the group or the group’s cause, but the cause may or may not be a 
morally good one.9 “The mixture of selfish and selfless behavior is one of the important 
characteristics of group loyalty, and this mixture can be seen in a wide variety of group 
associations varying from kinship relations and communities to trade unions and 
economic pressure groups.” (Sen 1987: 20) Some forms of commitment are morally 
suspect because of the way that the self is sublimated, as often happens with oppressed 
persons who come to believe that they are naturally or deservedly treated as second-class 
citizens.10  
It might be objected here that such explanations of behavior can be reduced to 
explanations in self-centered welfare terms. For example, acting on a promise might be 
explained as acting on one’s desire to appear to be a promise-keeper because, by 
appearing trustworthy and therefore being included in interactions that increase one’s 
                                                
9 Andrew Oldenquist (1982: 176) discusses loyalty as a third form of normative reason 
apart from self-interest on the one hand and impartial morality on the other. Loyalties on 
his account are similar to some forms of commitments on Sen, although I am discussing 
commitments here as descriptive motivations, not necessarily justifications of behavior.  
10 I thank Neal Becker for pressing this point, which I have written extensively about in 
(Cudd 2006). 
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future consumption, that raises one’s own (self-centered) welfare. But this reductivist 
impulse conflicts with our subjective feeling that in some cases it is not a desire but rather 
some external reason that motivates us. Furthermore, once the behaviorist impulse to 
avoid reference to internal mental states has been abandoned, there is no theoretical 
reason to impose either self-centered welfare or self-welfare goal assumptions. As long as 
commitments are not seen as violating self-goal choice, the theory of rational action as 
maximization of some objective function, some goal of the agent, still applies. The 
question is what goal is being maximized by the agent and whether this goal is internally 
or externally generated? Thus, there is no theoretical reason to reduce commitment to 
some basic desire, and retaining commitment as an explanatory variable better 
accommodates our intuitions and subjects’ reports in a wider variety of situations. 
3.3. Commitment, rationality, and agency 
Just how radical is the addition of commitment to the descriptive theory of 
agency? That depends upon whether the commitment can be seen as adhering to the 
assumption of self-goal choice. According to recent interpretations of Sen’s view, acting 
from the motivation of commitment may or may not involve violation of self-goal choice. 
In order to explicate Sen’s view, Philip Pettit (2005) helpfully distinguishes between 
goal-modifying commitment and goal-displacing commitment. A goal-modifying 
commitment is a commitment that alters the agent’s own goals based on recognition of 
others’ goals and of how the agent’s behavior affects them. A goal-displacing 
commitment is a motivation that replaces – as the determinant of the agent’s choice – the 
agent’s goals with another’s goals or the goal of a group, or possibly an impartial moral 
norm. It is only this latter sense of commitment as goal-displacing that violates the 
assumption of self-goal choice.  
The assumption of self-goal choice is deeply connected with the neoclassical 
economists’ understanding of rationality, but also, as Pettit clearly points out, with the 
dominant philosophical understanding of agency. On this understanding, an agent just is a 
being that acts to achieve its goals, where the possessive is as important as the existence 
of a goal toward which the act is directed. The agent’s goals might of course involve the 
goals of a group that the agent identifies with; as Sen states, “‘We’ may be the natural 
unit of first-person decision.” (Sen 1986b: 351) But acting from a collective goal that one 
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takes as at least in part one’s own is not mysterious. What would be puzzling is action 
which is not motivated by a goal with which the agent somehow identified or takes as her 
own. One who does not act towards one’s own goals is not autonomous in the most 
minimal sense of the term; there is something robotic, slavish, or simply non-agential 
about such a being. Now there are several things to be said about this point, and I will get 
to them in the next section when I explore varieties of committed action. But first I want 
to explore further the idea that commitment violates the economists’ understanding of 
rationality. 
In his early work on the behavioral foundations of economic theory in the 1970s, 
Sen takes maximization of goals to be the primitive notion of rationality, while relaxing 
the notion that these goals had to be self-interested. Sen argues that the real problem is 
the idea that an agent’s motivations can be expressed by one, univocal function. “The 
purely economic man is indeed close to being a social moron. Economic theory has been 
much preoccupied with this rational fool decked in the glory of his one all-purpose 
preference ordering.” (Sen 1977: 102) Sen proposed ways of describing non-self-
interested choices as rational in the sense of maximizing by formalizing a model that 
allows a dual or multivalued preference ordering. In his (1970) paper “Choice, Orderings 
and Morality,” Sen is concerned to show how mutual non-confession could be seen as 
rational in the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). Here he proposes that we view the agents as 
facing a choice between rank orderings of the strategy pairs based on PD type preferences 
(where each has a dominant strategy to defect) and Assurance Game (AG) preferences 
(where the first choice of each is to cooperate if the other would as well, although they 
prefer defection if the other might defect) and Other Regarding (OR) preferences (where 
each unconditionally prefers to cooperate with the other). If agents act as if they have AG 
or OR preferences, then they will do better than if they act as if they have PD 
preferences, even if they face a PD in terms of their individual welfare in the situation.  
Sen generalizes this to discuss the orderings of orderings, and in “Rational Fools,” 
he further refines the idea of meta-rankings of preference orderings. A meta-ranking is a 
ranking according to the preferences one has for particular preference orderings. Let X be 
the set of alternative and mutually exclusive combinations of actions under consideration, 
and let Y be the set of rankings of the elements of X. A ranking of the set Y will be called 
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a meta-ranking of action set X. Choosing according to meta-rankings will allow the 
model to express commitments to a variety of things, such as deontic obligations, 
morality, or other non-self-interested principles, by the meta-ranking, which can then be 
treated as a preference ordering that can fit into a maximizing model. Sen points out that 
this account of meta-rankings is a “structure”, not a “theory”, and the structure allows 
multiple theories. In sum, he writes, “the apparatus of ranking of rankings assists the 
reasoning which involves considering the merits of having different types of preferences 
(or of acting as if one has them).” (Sen 1977: 107)  
This work was prior to his clearly drawing the three-way distinction that separated 
self-goal choice from the other two aspects of self-interest, and prior to Pettit’s useful 
distinction between types or conceptions of commitment. It is these latter distinctions that 
permit us to clarify just how radical Sen’s account of commitment really is by asking 
whether this account includes goal-displacing commitments as well as goal-modifying 
ones. Armed with this distinction, we can read the phrase in the previous quote “having 
different types of preferences” as essentially different from the phrase “acting as if one 
has them,” in that the former is consistent with goal modifications, but the latter is not (if 
one does not in fact have those preferences). If goal-displacing commitment is to be 
understood as a way of “acting as if” one had preferences other than one in fact has, then 
this meta-ranking preference model can provide a formalization of goal-displacing 
commitment as action that is explained as maximizing some objective function.  
It may seem doubtful to suggest that Sen would insist that the model of rational 
behavior as maximization be retained when commitment is appealed to as the explanatory 
motivation. Writing on Sen’s conception of preference, Elizabeth Anderson (2001) 
interprets Sen’s theory of commitment as an account of motivation (i.e., motivation by a 
moral principle or a social norm of responsibility) that cannot be captured by a principle 
of maximization of utility even when utility is taken in the widest sense of whatever one 
values. She summarizes her exposition of Sen: “Thus, for explanatory purposes, Sen 
instrumentalized the concept of preference in two ways: first, by disambiguating the 
concept,  replacing it with three distinct concepts (choice, underlying motive, and 
welfare), and second, by articulating an alternative model of behavior, commitment, that 
was not framed in terms of preference satisfaction at all.” (Anderson 2001: 23) However, 
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Anderson sees this as implying a lacuna in his work, since he does not propose an 
alternative to the maximizing framework that would enable us to conceive of committed 
action as rational. “Sen does not propose an alternative, non-preference-based conception 
of rationality in terms of which committed action makes sense.” (Anderson 2001: 24) 
Sen’s response was to say that she misunderstood his claims about the theoretical reach 
of the maximizing framework, suggesting that the maximizing framework indeed could 
be stretched to rationalize goal-displacing commitments. (Sen 2001: 57) But even if the 
maximizing framework can be extended to account for goal-displacing commitments, 
Anderson still has a point about the conception of rationality in terms of which goal-
displacing committed action makes sense. In particular, we are owed an explanation of 
why it is rational to act as if one has goals that one does not in fact take as one’s own.  
Perhaps it is too quick to infer that Sen intends to subsume goal-displacing 
commitments under the maximizing framework, however. In a 1986 article, Sen offers a 
different account of rationality of choice, which characterizes rationality as whatever is 
not in the rejection set R(S) of those options that the agent decides are, on reflection, not 
to be chosen. He calls this notion of rationality “correspondence-rationality,” and says 
about it specifically “reflective choice is not required to correspond to the maximization 
of some particular thing.” (Sen 1986b: 346) Indeed he says that “there might not even be 
any ‘everything considered’ maximand.”(347)  So this leads me back to reading Sen as 
Anderson, Pettit, and others have read him, as making the more radical claim that goal-
displacing commitments cannot be explained within the maximizing framework. 
(Anderson 2001; Pettit 2005; Hausman 2005) Instead, they may be subsumed under this 
notion of correspondence-rationality, which covers various kinds of reflective thought 
that can be considered rational, but that are not further specified by Sen. The fundamental 
issue, though, is not whether goal-displacing commitments fit into the maximizing 
framework of rational choice theory. Rather it is an issue about agency. Is it an 
expression of agency to act on a commitment that one does not take as one’s own? 
 
4. Using commitment to explain behavior 
The essential thing for interpreting Sen’s descriptive theory of agency is to see 
how commitments play a role in the explanation of behavior. Five different types of 
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explanatory models that make use of commitment can be distinguished. The first three of 
these can be accommodated within the standard theory that takes agents to be maximizers 
of some objective function, but the latter two involve goal-displacing commitments that 
cannot fit this theory. 
First, commitment can be seen as a means of building a reputation or as a way of 
restraining oneself. In explaining behavior this way, commitment adheres to the 
assumptions of self-centered welfare (by helping to build a reputation to promote long-
term consumption) and self-welfare goal. Even if the motivation is derived from a social 
group norm, it individualizes the group motivation by modeling the agent as using the 
commitment instrumentally to further her own interest.11 Economic theories recognize 
this as a form of signaling behavior when it occurs in strategic contexts, and there is 
nothing radical in the use of this type of explanation in economics. (Binmore 2005) 
Commitment can also be used as a pre-commitment of the self in non-strategic contexts, 
e.g., to control one’s addiction to cigarettes by throwing away the full pack.12 
Second, persons sometimes choose to act on a principle or norm that they have 
deliberated on but that does not necessarily involve their own consumption. This 
intentionally committed behavior adheres to the assumptions of self-welfare goal as well 
as self-goal choice, but not self-centered welfare. Modeling behavior this way 
internalizes the external motivation of commitment, and is typical of identity formation. 
(Sen 1985a, 2006) The standard economic model still individualizes the group motivation 
by taking the group goal as the individual’s own, and it expresses the motivation as 
rational within the maximizing framework. Models of Rousseau’s stag hunt or Sen’s 
Assurance Game can be seen as expressing this, because the individual orders her 
preferences to rank the cooperative strategy above defecting, but the individual’s own 
ranking still determines the rational action. Such commitments may not replace all the 
                                                
11 This is not the form of commitment that Sen had in mind when he introduced the term, 
but such a reductivist account is possible. See (Gauthier 1986; Morris 2010). 
12 Elizabeth Anderson pointed out to me this non-strategic use of commitment. See also 
(Gauthier 1996). 
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other goals that an individual has, of course, and an individual may strategically pretend 
to be seeking this group goal when in fact she is shading toward her own.  
Third, persons can act out of social commitment and moral imperatives that they 
embrace as at least in part their own goals. Sometimes agents choose based on principles 
that are recognized in their communities, or that they recognize, as socially beneficial or 
morally good. If these commitments were seen as shaping the ultimate goal the agent 
seeks, then they could be subsumed under the maximizing framework by modeling the 
objective function to be maximized as reflecting these all-in goals. (Bossert and 
Suzumura 2009) This model of behavior involves denial of self-welfare goal but still 
adheres to self-goal choice. 
Fourth, persons can act, according to Sen, on commitments that replace their own 
goals. Sen’s primary example of such reasoning invokes the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The 
dilemma for the game theorist is how to explain the fact that people often cooperate in 
PD situations though standard game theoretic rationality requires defection. The various 
game-theoretic explanations and evasions of the problem reject the possibility of 
explaining cooperation in a true one-shot PD as rational. Here is where goal-displacing 
commitment plays a crucial role for Sen. By recognizing that the only way to “solve” the 
PD is to commit to cooperate, despite the fact that doing so entails sublimating their own 
goals to that of the community, persons can act rationally on a commitment to a goal that 
is not their own. Why do people do this, according to Sen? It is a kind of social thinking, 
“part of living in a community.” (Sen 1985a: 212) Modeling persons as behaving in this 
way preserves the notion that players have mutual knowledge of the game situation, and 
that the game accurately represents the individual preferences as the typical PD-type 
preferences.13 But it represents the players as playing as if they are playing an assurance 
game. Behaving ‘as if’ they have assurance game preferences can be interpreted as a way 
of adopting a group identity. Thus, according to Sen, persons can act rationally on group-
based preferences that are not their own but from which they rationally act as if they 
                                                
13 In preserving mutual knowledge of the game situation, it is unlike the Kreps, et.al. 
(1982) type of solution of the PD. In preserving the individual preferences it is unlike 
solutions that suppose that the individual mistakes the one-shot PD for a repeated game. 
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were. We can answer Anderson’s question in this case by pointing out that it is rational to 
act on these preferences that are not one’s own because by doing so one does better 
according to one’s own preference ordering than if one acts on those preferences 
directly.14 
Finally, behavior can be explained based on conventional rule following. Insofar 
as this is to be distinguished from explaining behavior as acting from social commitment 
and moral imperative, this explanatory schema also allows for behavior as motivated by a 
rule that displaces the agent’s own goal. Such behavior can be explained by evolutionary 
game theory, which is different from an intentional explanation with behavioral rules 
being deliberately chosen by an individual who considers how they should act. Sen points 
out that the evolutionary explanation can be combined with any of the other explanations 
because long-run survival might be enhanced by the ability to consider behavior in this 
way, that is evolutionary processes might affect not only the rules of behavior but also 
our psychological preferences. Or, I might add, our social norms or conventional rules. 
It is these last two types of explanatory models invoking commitment that call 
into question our usual understanding of agency as action based on the agent’s own goals. 
Sen claims that there is an “essential and irreducible” duality in the conception of persons 
as agents with goals and commitments, who also have a well-being that calls for 
attention.  
This dichotomy is lost in a model of exclusively self-interested 
motivation, in which a person’s agency must be entirely geared to his own 
well-being. But once that straitjacket of self-interested motivation is 
removed, it becomes possible to give recognition to the indisputable fact 
that the person’s agency can well be geared to considerations not covered 
                                                
14 As an anonymous referee pointed out, this response to Anderson raises a paradox 
related to the paradox of hedonism, that one best achieves happiness by not pursuing it 
directly. My main concern is the problem of asserting of an agent that she is pursuing a 
goal that she does not actually have, but merely acts as if she has. I will argue in the next 
section that acting on a tacit commitment or internalized social norm is a type of agency 
that allows the agent to be seen as pursuing and yet not aiming at a goal. 
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– or at least not fully covered – by his or her own well-being. (Sen 1987: 
49)  
Sen calls these the “well-being aspect” and the “agency aspect” of persons, as was noted 
earlier. Failure to recognize this duality of persons, Sen claims, impoverishes both the 
normative and the descriptive aspects of economic theory, that is, both welfare economics 
and the ability of economic models to explain behavior. Sen summarizes his view thus: 
“The object is to understand, explain and predict human behaviour in a way such that 
economic relationships can be fruitfully studied and used for description, prognosis, and 
policy. The jettisoning of all motivations and valuations other than the extremely narrow 
one of self-interest is hard to justify on grounds of predictive usefulness, and it also 
seems to have rather dubious empirical support.” (Sen 1987: 79)  
 
5. Agency as norm responsive behavior 
Although it is important to recognize the multiplicity of motivations agents have, 
the way Sen draws the distinction between the agency-aspect and the well-being aspect of 
persons does not help us to appreciate how his theory contrasts with the standard 
philosophical theory of agency. According to Sen, committed behavior is an expression 
of the agency aspect of persons, but some of what Sen calls behavior motivated by 
“commitment” is not self-goal directed and thus not an expression of agency on the 
standard view. The well-being aspect of persons is to be contrasted with the agency 
aspect and thus it is not an expression of agency. Persons’ understanding of their well-
being can motivate them to act, but well-being is not their only motivation. As Sen has 
argued, well-being understood in the narrow sense of self-interest captures only an aspect 
of the welfare of agents, and not necessarily their goals, let alone motivations for choice. 
Sen’s view that commitment can motivate action without its being the agent’s own goal 
contrasts with agency as understood on the standard model, and yet this contrast is not 
captured in the agency/well-being distinction. 
I believe that there is a more basic “essential duality” in Sen’s characterization of 
action based on commitment as opposed to self-interest, which allows both types of 
behavior to be seen as expressions of agency. I will call this the duality of autonomy-
agency vs. identity-agency. While autonomy-agency is agent-goal directed, identity-
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agency is other-goal directed. Explaining Anil’s choosing the mango by referring to his 
wish to impress his girlfriend with his commitment to cook authentic Indian food for the 
dorm fundraising dinner is an expression of autonomy-agency. Explaining Anil’s 
choosing the mango by referring to his habit of cooking the authentic food of his 
homeland is an expression of identity-agency. Autonomy-agency is explained as self-goal 
directed (in pursuit of self-welfare goals or goal-modifying commitments); identity-
agency is explained by goal-displaced commitments as motivating factors. 
 There are two points to emphasize, and to keep distinct, about the importance of 
commitment to the explanation of human behavior. The first is that commitments are 
crucial to understanding the agency aspect of persons, and the second is that seeing 
persons as acting on commitments is indispensable to the explanation of some behavior. 
The first point is one about autonomy-agency, which implies acting on reasons that are 
one’s own. If the behavior is to be seen as action expressing autonomous agency, then the 
goal has to be the agent’s own.15 Commitments that express autonomous agency either 
involve self-goal choice directly or indirectly through modifying the original self-goal 
and becoming a new self-goal on which the agent acts. But Sen also recognizes that 
commitments can motivate by displacing rather than modifying an agent’s goals, such as 
when unconsciously following social norms or expressing group identity.16 Sen writes, 
“rejection of self-goal choice reflects a type of commitment that is not able to be captured 
by the broadening of the goals to be pursued. It calls for behavior norms that depart from 
the pursuit of goals in certain systematic ways. Such norms can be analyzed in terms of a 
sense of ‘identity’ generated in a community…” (Sen 1985a: 219)  
Such behavior is clearly common and important to include in explanatory models 
of human behavior. At the same time goal-displacing commitments seem to deny agency, 
when agency is understood as the agent acting on his own goal. So although we seem to 
need both kinds of agency in our explanations of behavior, identity-agency looks to be an 
                                                
15 I see autonomy as minimally requiring the agent’s authentic identification with that 
motivation.  
16 (Bicchieri 2006: ch. 4) has an illuminating discussion of group identity and social 
norms along these lines. 
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oxymoron. Goal-displacing commitment based explanations depart from intentional 
rational choice explanations, and thus from the standard descriptive model of agency. 
Either they involve ‘as if’ explanations where agents sublimate their own goals for the 
sake of taking on a communal identity where the causal mechanism being posited is the 
communal goal that motivates the agent, or they involve behavior that is conditioned by 
evolved behavioral regularities that also override individual goals. Either way they are 
explanations that take the mechanism of behavior to be external to the individual agent.  
This implies, I think, that we need to posit a broader theory of human agency, in 
which human agency can be expressed as fundamentally social or biological in origin, 
rather than intentional. In this theory of agency, to be an agent is to act responsively in a 
normative framework. Formulating one’s conception of the good is one kind of response 
to a normative framework. Thus, the standard theory of agency as involving formulation 
of an end and acting in light of it is one type of agency on this broader view. Another way 
to act responsively in a normative framework is to act within normative constraints that 
one has internalized, but that one may not be consciously attending to. On this broader 
theory of agency, what makes behavior count as an expression of human agency is the 
fact that it is norm governed, though the norms need not be intentionally acted upon. 
Identity-agency, on this view of agency, is not an oxymoron. 
  
6. Tacit commitment and identity 
Goal-displacing commitment as a behavioral motivation remains puzzling 
because it is unclear to what degree we should see it as a species of action explanation. 
On the one hand it seems that a commitment can explain action only if it plays a role in 
the motivation of the action, and that seems to require it do so as a reason for action. On 
the other hand, it seems that as soon as it becomes a reason for an agent’s action it 
thereby becomes her reason for action, and thus a species of goal-modification, not goal-
displacement. I want to suggest that there is a type of goal-displacing commitment that 
can be seen to fit between the horns of this dilemma. I will call this “tacit commitment.” 
Tacit commitments, I propose, regulate behavior without being made conscious 
and explicit. Such behaviors include cliquish behavior that isn’t recognized as such, or 
conforming to background norms that one never questions. Why does Anil always cook 
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Indian food? Why do we wear formal suits in the summer in Kansas, where it is 100 
degrees (Fahrenheit) and humid? What accounts for product loyalty when the product is 
not clearly superior to others? Sure, sometimes we conform out of a conscious wish to do 
so, but sometimes we go along with such crowd behavior without examining it. What 
makes these behaviors ‘commitments’ in Sen’s sense is that they form a basis for group 
identity. Some tacit commitments may be less subtle and more socially complex, such as 
the norms of social distancing that we master as children, or the racial and ethnic 
prejudices that are instilled in many communities. Yet, once such commitments are 
recognized as guiding one’s behavior, they may or may not be embraced for future 
behavior. Of course, once embraced explicitly, such commitments are no longer tacit and 
behavior explained by reference to them is now explained in the standard intentional 
rational choice manner (though as neither self-centered welfare nor self-welfare goal).  
By tacit commitments I mean to refer to behavioral causes that are even more tacit 
than conventional rules. Tacit commitment is a kind of external motivation; it is not a 
commitment to a set of norms or constraints chosen from among other possible sets. 
Rather, an agent acting on a tacit commitment takes the norms or constraints as 
behavioral guides and others interpret that behavior as indicating something about the 
identity of the individual.  
Sen’s 2006 book, Identity and Violence, explores ways that persons take on 
identities that they seem to feel destined to embrace. He argues that we ought to see 
ourselves and each other as constituted by many different identities. And we should 
embrace the freedom to choose our identities and to choose not to identify with those 
group commitments that lead to hatred, prejudice, and violence. I wholeheartedly agree 
with his view. However, as Sen well recognizes, there are also forms of identity that are 
ascribed, non-voluntary, and non-intentional. This is why we feel destined to embrace 
identities even when we do not feel that by doing so we improve our well-being or 
achieve any of our own goals. Oppressed persons often feel destined to embrace their 
identity as an oppressed person because they are inevitable and inescapable, not because 
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the identity brings them well-being, pleasure, or dignity.17 These identities are 
constituted, I suggest, by tacit commitments that motivate behavior without involving 
deliberation or invoking questioning on the part of the agent. They are externally created 
and imposed, but internalized in the behavioral patterns of individuals. The identity that 
they create may be externally imposed as an ascribed identity. But they are enacted by an 
agent (exercising identity-agency) who takes them for granted and behaves according to 
them. Tacit commitments can be made explicit, questioned, and rejected. But insofar as 
they tacitly guide our behavior they constitute, at least in part, our ascribable group 
identities. 
Can tacit commitment be accommodated within an explanatory theory of action 
as maximization of an objective function, a self-goal? I believe that it can. Because tacit 
commitments guiding persons can be made explicit by the observing economist, they can 
be modeled as goals that the agent has, since he acts as if he is making his behavior 
correspond to them. Yet, being goals of the group that are unacknowledged by the agent, 
they are not realistically assumed to be the agent’s own goals.18 In this way we can see 
tacit commitment as playing both a motivating role in the behavior of the agent, and yet 
still not representing an actual, explicit, intentional commitment of the agent. The 
commitment is therefore not the self-goal choice of the agent, but rather a community 
goal.19 But given a goal that the agent is pursuing, the maximizing model of behavior can 
                                                
17 See, for example, discussion of the complicated preferences of the Sufi Pirzada women 
in (Narayan 2002), or the adaptive preferences of the women of El Pital in (Khader 2011: 
ch. 1). 
18 Tacit commitments can also be agents’ own goals even if they are not aware of their 
own goals.  Ordinary habitual behavior can be automatic and unconscious, but could still 
reflect the agent’s own goals, because it was originally acquired in pursuit of the agent’s 
conscious, intentional goals and still serves those ends. I thank Elizabeth Anderson for 
helping me to clarify this point. 
19 For a different account of the connection of goal-displacing commitments to 
community goals that involves intention, see (Schmid 2007). 
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be invoked. Furthermore, we can recognize acting on tacit commitments as an expression 
of identity-agency. 
It is important to recognize, categorize, and theorize tacit commitments as they 
actually exist, as unrecognized by the agents who are nonetheless motivated to behave by 
them. Yet this requires a kind of behavioral science that Sen himself does not engage in. 
This kind of motivation will be relative to context and situation, and discerning the social 
norms in play in any given situation will require thick descriptions of local culture. As 
Sen has long recognized, humans are social beings and choices are always social acts. 
(Sen 1973: 252-3) Social psychologists and anthropologists do investigate these kinds of 
motivations, and so it will be important to use their results to impute the right tacit 
commitments in economic models that must make use of them.  
One objection that might be raised to such multidisciplinary explanatory pluralism 
is that there is no overarching theory to specify which explanatory schema is to be used in 
a given instance. When should we ascribe the tacit ‘as if’ commitment to explain a 
behavior, as opposed to seeing the behavior as guided by an internalized social norm, or 
as guided by reputation seeking for long-run self interest? By allowing such a wide 
variety of models and goals we risk the charge of adhocness in any particular 
explanation. Although this charge raises a caution for explanatory pluralism, I do not 
think it overrides the benefits of seeing behavior as guided and motivated by a variety of 
forces internal and external to the agent. While some of the predictive value of the theory 
is sacrificed, much is gained in the ability to describe and evaluate behavior with this 
explanatory variety. (Sen 1980, 1986a.) As a philosophical theory of agency, however, 
this charge of adhocness does not apply. 
 
7. Conclusion 
My interpretation of Sen’s use of goal-displacing commitment to explain behavior 
has the virtue of allowing Sen to explain a wider variety of behavior and yet not making a 
conceptual mistake about the nature of agency, as Pettit charges. Instead we can see Sen 
as giving an alternative foundation to the theory of human agency; agency is 
fundamentally norm-governed behavior and consciously recognized norms comprise only 
some of those norms. It also allows the use of the maximizing model of rationality, which 
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conforms to his response to Anderson. Although the maximizing model of rationality can 
be invoked with tacit commitment explanations, the agent is seen as acting autonomously 
only if he or she embraces the rationalization of the model.20 I argued earlier that 
Anderson was correct to point out that Sen has not shown why it is rational to act as if 
one has preferences or goals that one does not in fact take as one’s own. In some cases, as 
I argued, agents are rational to act as if they have preferences other than the ones they in 
fact have because by doing so they better achieve the satisfaction of preferences they do 
have. But Sen need not show that tacit commitment is itself a rational motivation of the 
agent who acts when she acts. For the agent acting out of tacit commitment, the 
motivation is not intentional. The commitment need only be rationalizable when 
considered from the perspective of the observer, or from the perspective of the agent once 
it is made explicit. There is a danger of rationalizing too much behavior; there is always 
the possibility that behavior is irrational or self-deceptive, after all. The key here to 
formulating good social science about irrational or non-rational behavior is to find the 
systematic regularities of social situations or neurotic or other internal causes of behavior 
that justify resorting to such explanations in favor of rationalizing ones. There is of 
course a lot to say about such modeling decisions, but that would take us too far afield.  
 In this paper I have tried to interpret Sen’s account of behavioral motivation and 
his critique of standard economic models of behavior. For Sen, the purpose of economic 
science is to “to understand, explain and predict human behaviour in a way such that 
economic relationships can be fruitfully studied and used for description, prognosis, and 
policy.” (Sen 1987: 79) I take this to be a summary of his pluralism and pragmatism 
about social science models. This can equally well be seen from the fact that he 
recognizes and discusses a variety of different and competing models of behavior, 
suggesting that different ones are appropriate for different situations. If we take 
economics to help us by way of describing and prescribing motivations, then we can see 
that each of the explanatory schemas that Sen discusses allows for a different possible 
                                                
20 There may be additional requirements for acting autonomously; embracing the 
commitment or norm motivating one’s action is a necessary, not sufficient requirement 
for autonomy. 
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source of motivation: self-interest, sympathy, social norms, conventional rules, group 
oriented goal modifying commitments, and goal-displacing commitments. On some of 
these schemas, we can model behavior as intentional and rational via the standard 
maximizing model, while on some others behavior is non-intentional, though 
rationalizable. Sen allows that there are some behaviors best understood as primarily 
individually oriented and internally motivated, while others are best understood as 
motivated externally by group norms. These forms of motivated behavior are best seen as 
expressions of human agency broadly conceived, types of which I have termed 
autonomy-agency and identity-agency. 
 In his paper “Prediction and economic theory” Sen refers to two aspects of 
complexity that make prediction in economics difficult, one is the choice problem, which 
is just the problem of the many different kinds of factors – “social, political, 
psychological, biological, and other factors” – that influence behavior, and the other is 
the interaction problem, which arises from the interactions of many individuals whose 
behavior is influenced by so many factors, as well as “different values, objectives, 
motivations, expectations, endowments, rights, means, and circumstances dealing with 
each other in a wide variety of institutional settings.” (Sen 1986a: 5) These aspects reflect 
both the motivational pluralism Sen acknowledges in his critique of standard economic 
models of behavior, and his recognition of the normative situatedness of human behavior. 
On Sen’s account, explanation requires social contextualization whether we 
model behavior as internally motivated by self-interest or externally motivated by social 
norms. He argues that we cannot get sufficiently accurate predictions or realistic 
explanations by overlooking commitments. “The jettisoning of all motivations and 
valuations other than the extremely narrow one of self-interest is hard to justify on 
grounds of predictive usefulness, and it also seems to have rather dubious empirical 
support.” (Sen 1987: 79) But commitments are sometimes a group interest or social 
norm, which is necessarily contextual. Although Sen recognizes the need for context, 
there is no reason to think that this cannot be pursued scientifically by social 
psychologists and anthropologists. Yet, as he notes, the work of social and behavioral 
sciences is fundamentally different from that of physical scientists in needing to take 
intentions into account as additional kinds of causal mechanisms. 
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Given the normative situatedness of human behavior, values and facts cannot be 
separated entirely from each other. Economics must always take norms into account as 
among the facts to be explained, and is itself a normative project when its models 
prescribe actions for individuals and social policy. Sen has been a forceful proponent of 
recognizing and embracing the interconnections of ethics and economics, continuing a 
tradition that he often traces to Adam Smith. Economics stands to be a better explanatory 
social science by enhancing its understanding and appreciation of the sources of 
motivation beyond private self-interest. 
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